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two zones suggest that GCC bloc should peg to a basket of currencies as a transitory step 
on the way toward a more flexible exchange rate regime.    
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Common Currency Peg in the GCC Area: The Optimal  
Choice of Exchange Rate Regime 
 
1. Introduction 
The six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—Bahrain Kuwait, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates plan to introduce a single currency in 2010.  The 
plans for monetary integration between these six countries date back to the inception of the GCC 
in 1981, and the endorsement of the unified economic agreement in 1982. The process toward 
economic integration had gone slowly but in 2001 it gained momentum, culminating in the 
ratification of a new economic agreement.  The new agreement sets a specified timetable to 
achieve the requirements of the monetary union. These requirements include the harmonization 
of all economic policies, particularly fiscal and monetary policies, the standardization of banking 
regulations and the meeting of the convergence criteria. In January 2003, the GCC countries 
formed a customs union and applied a common external tariff.  On the same date, these 
countries formally pegged their currencies to the U.S. dollar.   
The introduction of the GCC single currency in 2010 will necessitate the creation of a 
single GCC central bank, a single GCC monetary policy and the choice of a common GCC 
exchange rate regime.  The choice of the type of the exchange rate regime prior to 2010 is one of 
the key economic policies pending for the GCC countries.  Should these countries allow the new 
currency to be fixed to the U.S. dollar, to a basket of currencies where the dollar and the euro 
have the largest proportion or to let the currency float subject to possible exchange market 
interventions from time to time?  Each choice has its own merits and drawbacks. In this paper we 
examine the optimality of making an exchange rate arrangement.   
As a forward-looking study, this paper considers the GCC countries as a prospective 
single monetary union, and thus constructs weighted averages of two key macroeconomic 
variables, namely real GDP and the price level across the GCC members.  The objective is to 
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assess the impacts of terms-of-trade shocks and the dollar and euro zones’ shocks on the GCC 
economies, by focusing on which exchange rate regime would be optimal for this union.    
A growing consensus among economists is that emerging economies should move to a 
corner solution; that is, they should consider either a fully floating or a rigidly fixed exchange rate 
regime.  Frankel (2000) argues that intermediate exchange rate regimes are vanishing (or should 
be). Yet the question of what type of regime is appropriate for emerging economies still remains a 
highly debated issue.  As most of the emerging economies lack a well-developed financial market 
and liquid financial instruments, the role of monetary policy under a flexible regime may be 
limited.  Even if a country satisfies the determinants for a flexible regime, many still argue that the 
gains from the credibility of tying the local currency to an international anchor can be greater than 
the benefits of adopting a floating exchange regime.  Others, however, endorse a basket peg as a 
superior alternative to a bilateral, rigidly fixed exchange rate regime.  Since basket pegs tend to 
be more flexible than bilateral pegs, Gudmundsson (2005) argues that the move from a bilateral 
peg to a basket peg can be an important step on the way to a flexible exchange rate regime.  
More recently, the importance of pegging the local currency to the price of the major exported 
commodity began to surface. Frankel (2002, 2003a and 2003b), for example, argues that 
countries who are specialized in the production and exports of a mineral or agricultural 
commodity can benefit from pegging their currencies to the price of their exported commodity.  He 
finds that under the Peg Export Price (PEP) proposal, countries that suffered from a declining 
world market in oil or in other commodities in the 1990s would have automatically experienced 
currency depreciation, and that would have boosted exports when it was needed.  The PEP can 
simultaneously deliver automatic accommodation to terms-of-trade shocks, while at the same 
time helping these countries maintain the credibility of pegging their currencies to a nominal 
anchor such as the dollar or other  pegging arrangements.                                                                                                         
In an empirical study of the alternative exchange rate arrangements and financial 
integration for GCC countries, Abed et al. (2003) compare the dollar peg to a dollar-euro basket 
peg as alternative exchange rate regimes for improving the external stability of the GCC 
countries.  They suggest that the basket peg dominate the dollar peg in improving stability.  They 
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also suggest that as GCC exports become more diversified, a more flexible exchange rate policy 
such as pegging the prospective common currency to a dollar/euro basket may become 
necessary for both competitiveness and stability purposes. In addition to the competitiveness and 
external stability reasons, Jadresic (2002) focuses on other policy considerations in choosing a 
currency peg for the GCC.  Those considerations include the credibility of the exchange and 
monetary policy stance, the effects of exchange rate volatility on financial markets, and 
transaction costs arising from exchange rate volatility. Jadresic finds that these considerations 
dominate competitiveness and external stability.  Fasano and Schaechter (2003) compare the 
conditions for creating a successful GCC monetary union to other monetary unions already in 
existence (for example, the euro zone, CFA franc zone. etc). These authors emphasize the need 
for the GCC members to develop an institutional union framework (such as a decentralized 
central bank, common monetary instruments, financial crises system…etc)  and to set some 
basic quantitative benchmarks such as the European Union’ Maastricht Agreements.  
Hammoudeh and Aleisa (2004) examine financial integration in the GCC stock markets.  They 
find that these markets are cointegrated in the sense that they have multiple long-run 
relationships.  However, in terms of short-term dynamics, the authors find limited causal 
relationships among the GCC stock markets.   
The primary objective of this paper is to investigate the optimality of tying the proposed 
common GCC currency to the U.S. dollar or to a basket of currencies, and/or of having a more 
flexible exchange rate regime.  Applying the theory of Optimum Currency Area (OCA) and using a 
structural VAR model, we investigate the roles played by terms of trade shocks, global shocks 
(the U.S. dollar zone and euro zone), and regional shocks in affecting the GDP of the GCC 
countries, by focusing on what the optimal choice of the exchange rate regime is.  We consider 
regional shocks to be the same as domestic shocks, since regional GDP is the weighted average 
of the GCC countries. To investigate to what extent GDP in the GCC area is influenced by the 
real oil price, the U.S., and/or European shocks, and domestic shocks, we aggregate two key 
macroeconomic variables, namely real GDP, and the consumer price index (CPI) to investigate 
the response of these macroeconomic variables to the aforementioned shocks.  Specifically, we 
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will try to answer the following two questions: (1) to what extent do the GCC economies influence 
and to what extent are influenced by real oil prices?; (2) is the business cycle of the GCC area as 
a bloc related to its trading partners’ (particularly the US and the Euro areas) economic activity in 
such as a way that a monetary policy’s move by these partners at a particular time would happen 
to be the right policy for the GCC area too? 
The balance of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 provides an overview of the 
optimum currency area.  Section 3 presents an overview of the GCC economy.  Section 4 
describes the benchmark model for the GCC as a prospective single bloc and identifies the 
relative impacts of the domestic and external shocks. Section 5 examines the estimation results 
of the benchmark model.  Section 6 describes an alternative model as a robustness check on 
data aggregation in the first model and section 7 examines the estimation results of this 
alternative model.  Section 8 provides the main conclusions. 
 
2. The Optimum Currency Area 
 
The literature on the theory of OCA pioneered by Mundell (1961) and subsequently by 
McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969) suggests several criteria that can be used in examining the 
suitability of a common monetary arrangement. The criteria include symmetry of the underlying 
macroeconomic shocks, factor mobility, openness, fiscal redistribution schemes and real wage 
flexibility, among others. More recently, some authors emphasized the need for a supra -national 
government body to conduct interregional transfers (De Grauwe, 1997).  Frankel and Rose (1997, 
and 1998), Corsetti and Pesenti (2002), and De Grauwe and Mongelli (2005), examine the 
endogeneity of the optimum currency area.  These authors’ findings confirm that monetary unions 
lead to significant increases in trade integration. For example, Frankel and Rose (1997 and 1998) 
argue that even if a country does not meet the criteria of the OCA ex ante, the increase in trade 
within the monetary union resulting from the introduction of the common currency may qualify this 
country to satisfy the OCA criteria ex post.   
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The GCC economies seem to be fairly integrated in terms of economic structures and 
trade. They have a remarkable degree of monetary and fiscal convergence, low inflation in all 
member states and narrow short-term interest rate movements. These members have highly 
open economies and a high degree of labor and capital mobility within the GCC region. 
Furthermore, the GCC countries have over time established a broad range of institutions to 
support the economic integration process. The aforementioned factors support the view that the 
GCC is more likely to experience symmetric shocks, thus reducing the likeliness of asymmetric 
shocks and the need to resort to nominal exchange rate adjustments.   
Forming a monetary union among the GCC countries would entail some costs, but 
membership in a currency union may provide greater potential benefits to these states.  There are 
key benefits that can be achieved from such an arrangement.  First, a single currency would 
eliminate the transaction costs associated with using different currencies among the GCC 
countries, and this cost elimination would minimize the magnitude of price discrimination between 
their markets. Second, one can expect some efficiency gains associated with enhanced trade and 
increased capital flows as a result of abandoning a multiplicity of currencies.  Even though each 
GCC country follows a fixed exchange rate system, a common GCC currency is more credible 
than just having a fixed rate system for the individual country.  Third, a common GCC currency 
would induce national price convergence and would imply a common real exchange rate for all 
members.  There may be welfare gains from less uncertainty about future real exchange rates.  
Fourth, a single currency would promote better policy formulation and coordination of national 
economic policies.  A decentralized strategy for economic policies among the six markets will 
create healthy competition that should promote the best policies.  Equally important, the 
integration of the GCC capital market will deepen the width and breadth of the financial market, 
enabling domestic investors to diversify their investments and giving firms efficient access to raise 
capital.  However, membership in a common currency union will reduce policy independence, that 
is, membership in a monetary union prevents member states from implementing country-specific 
monetary and fiscal policies in response to country-specific disturbances.     
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3. An Overview of the GCC Economies 
  
Although some of the GCC countries have to some extent been successful in diversifying 
their production base, oil continues to be the key element of their output (Table 1).  In this table, 
the oil sector still accounts for about 31.6% of the GCC’s real GDP over the period 1998-2003.  It 
should be noted that much as diversification away from oil is considered to be an important 
element for the GCC area’s economies, diversification of government revenues is also important.  
As is always the case, falling oil prices exert pressure on the local currencies, making the 
proposed new currency vulnerable to developments in the world oil market.  Thus, policies to 
diversify governments’ revenues are as crucial as the diversification of the GCC economies.  In 
terms of openness, Table 1 shows that the GCC countries have highly open economies as 
evidenced by the high ratios of imports and exports to GDP.  This table also shows that the GCC 
countries have an average growth rate of about 3.8% over the period 1998-2003, and that their 
inflation rates are stable over this period.   Moreover, Table 2 shows that the GCC countries not 
only have stable and low inflation, but also the individual country inflation rates have significant 
correlations averaging around 50%.      
The overall intra-trade between the GCC countries is fairly limited. The individual 
members’ exports trade patterns within the GCC region and with other countries and regions are 
provided in Table 3.  This table also shows that, except for Saudi Arabia, GCC exports to the rest 
of the world are concentrated in Asia.  In contrast, GCC imports seem to be concentrated in the 
European Union, followed by Asia as demonstrated in Table 4.  
 
4. The Benchmark Model and Methodology 
 
Consider a three-variable VAR, open-economy model to examine the optimal choice of 
an exchange rate regime for the GCC countries as a prospective monetary union.  The three 
variables are global output (real GDP of the US and /or the European Union), real oil price, and 
regional output (as the geometrically weighted average of the GCC real GDPs).  The model can 
be written as an infinite moving-average process in the shocks, 
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where the vector  ∆ h g rt t t tX [ y y y ],= ∆ ∆ ∆  (representing rates of change in real oil price or 
terms of trade hty , global output 
g
ty ,  and regional output 
r
ty ) is subject to three mutually 
uncorrelated “structural” shocks with finite variances (the terms of trade shocks htε , the global 
shocks (U.S. dollar zone or euro zone) gtε , and the regional shocks rtε , denoted by the 
vector h g rt t t t[ ]ε ε ε ε= ∆ ∆ ∆ ), and ( )A L  is a matrix whose elements are polynomials in the lag 
operator L.   
We make the following assumptions: (1) only oil price shocks have a long-run impact on 
oil prices; (2) global variables are affected only by global shocks in the long run; and (3) regional 
shocks have no long-run impact on global output. 
 
4.1. Identification of the shocks 
 
Assume that the covariance-stationary vector tX∆  can be written as an infinite moving 
average process in the structural shocks: 
t
0
X ( ) ,i t i t
i
A A Lε ε
∞
−
=
∆ = =∑                                                                                                           (2) 
where ( )A L  is a matrix whose elements are polynomials in the lag operator L., let us denote the 
elements of ( )A L  by ( )ija L .  The time path of the effects of a shock in jε  on variable i after 
k periods can be denoted by ( )ij kω .  Additionally, let (1)A  represent a matrix of long-run effects 
whose element are (1)ija ; each element gives the cumulative effect of a shock in jε  on 
variable i over time.  Similarly, 0A is the matrix of the contemporaneous effects and is consistent 
with (0)ijω .  Given the model structure, the long-run effects of the shocks can be summarized in 
a matrix form, 
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Note that the matrix of the long-run effects is the lower triangular matrix. 
 
5. Empirical Results of Benchmark Model 
 
We estimate the benchmark model for the prospective GCC union as a single bloc using 
the aggregated quarterly data. The data were collected for the period 1980:01 to 2003:04, from 
the U.S., the European Union countries, and the six GCC countries.  The data are taken from the 
IMF’s International Financial Statistics CD-Rom database.  Due to the lack of quarterly data on 
the GCC GDPs, we use the Ginsburgh method to extract quarterly GDP from annual data2.  The 
data for the US includes the real GDP and the price level proxied by the US CPI, for the 
European Union the real GDP and the price level (proxied by Germany CPI), and for the GCC 
countries the real oil price, the weighted average of the individual real GDPs and the weighted 
average of  individual price levels.  Due to the unavailability of quarterly data on the individual 
CPIs for all GCC member countries, we use the CPIs for Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Kuwait as a 
proxy for the whole GCC countries’s weighted average CPI, constituting approximately 75% of 
the weight of the GCC. Therefore, we proxy terms of trade by real oil price (crude oil price 
deflated by the US CPI), the GCC real output by the weighted GCC real GDP, the global output 
by the U.S. real GDP and/or European Union real GDP, the global price level by the U.S. CPI 
and/or , the German CPI for the European Union, and the GCC CPI by the weighted average of 
the CPI’s of Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia . 
To properly specify the empirical model, an important step in constructing the model is to 
test for unit roots and stationarity of the variables used. The results of Augmented Dickey Fuller 
(ADF) and KPSS tests are presented in Table 5.  The ADF test statistics indicate that the 
presence of a unit root in the output levels (for the U.S. real GDP, the European Union real GDP, 
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 Oil production index was used as reference to extract the quarterly GDP.  
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and the GCC real GDP), the real oil price level, and the price levels (for the U.S. CPI, the German 
CPI, and the GCC CPI) cannot be rejected.  Similarly, the KPSS test rejects stationarity for all 
variables at the conventional significance levels3.  Hence, it is appropriate to model the variables 
in the first differences.  Note that the vector h g rt t t tX [ y y y ]= ∆ ∆ ∆  makes up the VAR which is 
estimated with five lags.  The AIC diagnostic tests indicate that five lags are appropriate for 
residuals to approximate white noise.  The dynamic effects of the innovations can best be 
understood by carrying out the variance decompositions (VDC) and impulse response functions 
typical for the VAR methods.   
Table 6 reports VDC of forecast errors for only the regional output because the aim of 
this paper is to examine the impacts of terms of trade shock and global shock (the US and the 
European impacts) on the GCC economies as a single bloc.  We do not report the results for the 
global output and the real oil price as these two variables are explained by own global and real oil 
price shocks, respectively.  The VDC results in Table 6 (the dollar zone) demonstrate that 
domestic shocks explain the bulk of the regional output movements4.  Terms-of-trade shocks 
seem to have a negligible impact on the regional output in the short run, but in the long run, those 
shocks account for over 33 percent of the forecast error variance compared to 55 percent for the 
domestic shocks.  Global shocks seem to have a modest impact in the long run accounting for 
about 11 percent of the forecast error variance.  An interesting aspect of the results is that the 
impacts of global shocks in the dollar zone are modest despite the dominant role played by the 
dollar in the economies of these countries (for example, the bulk of their oil exports is 
denominated in dollar terms).  But the terms-of-trade shocks seem to explain a sizable proportion 
of the GCC regional output movements in the long run, and the business cycles of the GCC 
countries as a bloc do not appear to be driven by the output movements in the U.S. 
Similar to the dollar zone, the VDC results for the euro zone in Table 6 show that the 
terms-of-trade shocks seem to have negligible impacts in the short run. In contrast, they explain 
over 21 percent of regional output movements in the long run, still significantly lower than in the 
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 The unit root results are available upon request.   
4
 We consider regional shocks as domestic shocks since the regional output is the weighted averages of the 
GCC individual real GDPs. 
Comment [LCoB1]: Eisa what tests? 
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U.S. dollar zone. As is the case in the dollar zone, global shocks appear to have insignificant 
impacts on regional output variations in the short run, but they have greater effects in the long run 
reaching about 15% in six years compared to 11% for the dollar zone.  Thus, domestic shocks 
appear to explain the bulk of regional output movements similar to the dollar zone.   
To sum up, the business cycle of the GCC countries as a bloc does not seem to be 
driven by output movements in their trading partners, specifically the U.S. and the European 
Union.  Furthermore, the terms-of-trade and domestic shocks appear to explain a sizable 
proportion of the regional output movements in the GCC countries.   
Figure 1 provides the results of the impulse response functions (IRF) analysis.  The left 
panel of this figure shows the responses of regional output to the euro zone global and domestic 
shocks, while the right panel displays the responses of the regional output to the same shocks 
with the global shocks emanating from the dollar zone.  This figure shows that a positive one 
standard deviation shock to the real oil price (terms of trade) leads to a slight increase in regional 
output.  While the response of the regional output to a positive standard deviation shock to the 
global shocks (euro zone) leads to a slight increase in regional output, the response to the U.S. 
shocks seems to be negative.  Overall, the responses of regional output to these shocks are 
insignificant.  The responses to both the dollar and euro zones shocks seem to be consistent with 
the views that tightening money supply in these zones will lead to contraction in global output 
growth, which then leads to a decrease in oil prices.  Positive domestic shocks lead to a slight 
increase in regional output.   
The results from the assessments of both the effects of the dollar and euro zone shocks 
suggest that the GCC countries seem to be mainly driven by the terms-of-trade and domestic 
shocks.  In fact, continuing to peg the local GCC currencies to the U.S. dollar may be too costly. It 
could lead to a condition in which the U.S. monetary policy changes may act as a destabilizing 
force for the GCC economies. 
 
6. The Alternative Model 
 12 
We construct an alternative model for each of the six GCC countries and for the dollar 
and euro zones to be employed as a robustness check on the sensitivity of the results of the 
benchmark model to the quarterly data generation and selection. We follow the same procedures 
proposed by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) in which they examined the feasibility of the North 
American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) as a common currency area. Using a bivariate VAR with a 
vector of the variables ∆Xt for the first logarithmic differences of output and price for each of the 
countries and zones, the alternative model can also be expressed as an infinite-moving average 
process of two types of shocks, demand shocks dtε , and supply shocks, stε .  The model can be 
written in the following form: 
t 0 1 1 2 2X ... ( )t t t tA A A A Lε ε ε ε− −∆ = + + + =                                                                     (1) 
 
where tX∆ =  [ ty∆ tp∆ ], ( )A L  is a matrix whose elements are polynomials in the lag operator 
L, the matrix iA represents the impulse response functions of the two shocks.  Denote that the 
framework implies that supply shocks have permanent effects on the level of output but demand 
shocks have temporary effects (Blanchard and Quah (1989), Bayoumi (1992), and Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen (1994)). If the vector tX∆ is stationary, then the bivariate model in the structural 
shocks has the form 
t 11 12
t 21 22
y C ( ) C ( )
p C ( ) C ( )
dt
st
L L
L L
ε
ε
  ∆  
    =     ∆        
                                                                                              (5) 
 
where ty and tp  represent the logarithms of output and prices as indicated above, dtε  and stε  
are mutually uncorrelated demand  and supply shocks, respectively, with zero means.  The 
shocks can be identified by imposing the restrictions that supply shocks have permanent effects 
on the level of output, but demand shocks have only temporary effects.  Supply and demand 
shocks have permanent effects on the price level.  These assumptions can be represented by the 
restriction that the coefficients in  11C ( )L  sum to zero; the restriction is equivalent to  
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0
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k
k
∞
=
=∑                                                                                                                           (6) 
Placing this restriction in equation (5) conveys that the cumulative effect of dtε on ty∆  is zero.  
As mentioned above, the two shocks are demand shocks dtε , and supply shocks stε . This 
restricted framework implies that supply shocks have permanent effects on the level of output but 
demand shocks have temporary effects.    
 
7. Empirical Results of the Alternative Model  
 
Table 7 presents the correlations of supply and demand shocks between each of the six 
individual GCC countries and the U.S. and the European Union.  On the supply side, Bahrain and 
the United Arab Emirates show moderate correlations with the U.S. Kuwait seems to show 
insignificant negative correlations, while Qatar displays high correlations with the U.S.  Similarly, 
the results also display low negative correlations between the GCC countries and the European 
Union. While Oman and the United Arab Emirates show negative correlations with the European 
Union, Kuwait seems to display positive correlations.   
On the demand side, Qatar and Oman show high positive correlations with the U.S., but 
Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and UAE display negative correlations with the U.S.  Overall, the 
GCC economies seem to have insignificant correlations with the US, except for Qatar.  This 
result, in conjunction with external shock impacts (or the lack thereof) casts doubts on the 
suitability of pegging the proposed GCC common currency to a composite basket with the dollar 
and the euro holding the largest shares. 
 
8. Conclusions 
 
 As the GCC countries are taking very important steps towards forming a monetary union 
and introducing a single currency in 2010, this paper examines the relative impacts of domestic 
and external shocks on the region’s economies hypothesized as a single bloc. We have 
constructed weighted averages of key macroeconomic variables of the GCC countries to shade 
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some light on the structural properties of the GCC area as a single economic system.  This study 
has applied structural VAR methods primarily to investigate the roles of terms of trade, the dollar, 
and euro zones, and regional (domestic) shocks on the GCC as a prospective single economy, 
focusing on the optimal choice of exchange rate regime. The results show that domestic shocks 
explain the bulk of GCC output movements.  Equally important, the terms-of-trade shocks 
particularly in the long run play an important role in explaining GCC output movements.  Despite 
the actual dominant role of the dollar and the strong existing trade between the GCC countries 
and the European Union, global shocks (the dollar and euro zones) seem to have a modest 
impact on prospective GCC union’s domestic output. The business cycles of these countries as a 
single bloc do not appear to be driven by output movements in the US and the EMU regions.   
 Moreover, the correlations between each of the GCC individual countries with the U.S. 
and the European Union seem to be weak and cast doubt on the optimality of a composite basket 
of the dollar and the euro as an anchor for the GCC proposed common currency.   
 To sum up, the results from the assessments of both the effects of the dollar and euro 
zones suggest that the GCC economies seem to be driven by terms-of-trade and domestic 
shocks.  In that sense, a more flexible exchange rate regime may be more suitable to the GCC 
area.  Yet as these countries are in the process of forming a monetary union and plan to 
introduce a single currency in 2010, one must initially consider the benefits arising from the 
credibility and stability of the new currency.  In such a case, it might be optimal to construct a 
basket of currencies where the U.S. dollar and the euro should have the largest shares.  In that 
sense, a peg to a basket of currencies is more flexible than that of a bilateral peg, and it would be 
an important step on the way towards a more flexible exchange rate regime.    
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Table 1.  Selected Macroeconomic Indicators for the GCC countries (1998-2003) 
 
Country/Region Bahrain Kuwait/1 Oman Qatar/1 Saudi 
Arabia 
UAE/1 
Share of GCC GDP (%) 2.5 10.2 3.3 6.7 56.6 20.7 
Non-oil 84.2 65.5 52.8 42.4 44.1 77.4 
Oil 15.7 34.5 28.0 57.6 32.7 22.6 
Real GDP  
by Sectors 
(%) 
Government 0.1 n/a 19.2 n/a 23.2 n/a 
% of Oil In Total Gov.  
Revenues 15.7 34.5 28.0 57.6 32.7 22.6 
Real GDP Growth Rate 
(%) 4.6 2.5 3.5 9.7 2.5 5.8 
Inflation Rate (%) 0.7. 1.7 -0.3 3.2 0.4 2.8 
Current Account Balance 0.1 7.7 0.7 2.0 9.7 5.9 
Current Account/GDP (%) 0.9 18.6 2.1 3.4 4.0 8.5 
Share in World Oil 
Production (%) 0.06 3.3 1.3 1.1 13.1 3.5 
Exports within the GCC/2 6.9 1.4 14.0 4.9 4.4 14.8 
Imports within the GCC/3 34.3 9.9 41.3 14.9 3.7 5.0 
Exports/GDP (%) 79.1 60.5 71.6 63.8 51.2 n/a 
Imports/GDP (%) 63.6 34.3 40.3 23.7 20.3 n/a 
 
Notes:  
1/  Non-oil sector includes the government sector. 
2/  In % of total exports  
3/ In % of total imports within  
Sources: IMF DOT, Monetary Agencies and central banks.  
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Table 2.  Correlations of inflation 
 Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi 
Arabia 
UAE 
Bahrain       
Kuwait 0.51      
Oman 0.25 0.62     
Qatar 0.46 0.56 0.52    
Saudi 
Arabia 
0.56 0.47 0.29 0.50   
UAE 0.52 0.29 0.50 0.43 0.50  
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Table 3.  Directions of GCC countries exports 
Country/Region Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi 
Arabia 
UAE5 
Within the GCC 6.9 
 
1.4 
 
14.0 
 
4.9 
 
4.4 
 
14.8 
United States 5.7 
 
11.5 
 
4.4 
 
1.7 
 
19.0 
 
4.2 
European Union 5.8 
 
10.0 
 
2.8 
 
2.1 
 
14.4 
 
12.4 
Japan 2.0 
 
21.2 
 
21.3 
 
46.7 
 
14.2 
 
2.6 
Asia 
(ex. Japan) 
13.1 
 
47.4 
 
78.4 
 
37.1 
 
29.6 
 
42.6 
Exports/GDP (%) 47.0 
 
48.4 
 
22.1 
 
67.5 
 
31.3 
 
n/a 
 
 
                                               
5
 Non oil exports for the 2nd quarter, 2004.   
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Table 4.  Directions of GCC countries Imports 
Country/Region Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE 
Within the GCC 34.3 
 
9.9 
 
41.3 
 
14.9 
 
3.7 
 5.0 
United States 10.9 
 
14.9 
 
9.3 
 
12.2 
 
13.7 
 
9.3 
European Union 23.1 
 
34.4 
 
30.9 
 35.1 44.9 
29.8 
Japan 7.4 
 10.4 25.4 10.5 11.1 
10.7 
Asia  
(ex. Japan) 
10.2 
 18.3 23.1 17.2 39.5 
33.8 
Imports/GDP(%) 37.8 
 
27.5 
 
12.5 
 
25.1 
 
12.4 
 
n/a 
 
 
 
Table 5.  Unit Root and Stationarity Tests 
 
Test p yGCC  yUS  yEuro  h 
ADF Statistic -1.07 -2.47 -2.59 -1.16  
KPSS 
Statistic 
1.53 1.55 1.60 0.9 1.10 
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Table 6.  Variance décompositions  
 
Percent of forecast error variance attributed to shocks 
 
 
h
tε  
g
tε  
r
tε  
Regional output Horizon 
(quarters) 
                                        Dollar zone 
 
1 6.6 11.3 82.1 
4 21.0 5.5 73.5 
8 26.8 6.5 66.7 
16 33.7 9.8 56.5 
24 36.7 11.3 52.1 
Euro zone 
 
1 5.4 0.4 94.3 
4 21.1 8.0 70.9 
8 22.6 10.8 66.5 
16 21.6 13.8 64.6 
24 21.4 14.6 64.0 
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Figure 1.  Response of regional output   
                               (Euro zone )                                                           (Dollar zone) 
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Table 7. Correlations of supply shocks: the GCC countries with the US and the European 
Union 
Correlations of supply shocks 
Country/Region Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi 
Arabia 
UAE 
The US 
 
0.10 -0.03 0.05 0.41 0.04 0.1 
EMU 
 
0.14 0.03 -0.23 0.08 -0.17 -0.13 
 
Correlations of demand shocks 
The US 
 
-0.86 -0.57 0.44 0.78 -0.61 -0.48 
EMU 
 
0.65 0.66 -0.92 -0.74 0.89 -0.19 
 
 
